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American Political Culture and the Law of the Workplace 
Reuef Schiller* 
In two articles previously published in this Journal, I described Ameri-
can labor and employment law, and then compared it with the Japanese 
law of the workplace. l ) One of my conclusions was that, not surprisingly, 
the contrasting cultures of Japan and the United States generated different 
types of law regulating the employment contract. A similar contrast ex-
ists between labor and employment law regimes that developed at differ-
ent times within the United States. American labor and employment law 
developed in two waves. During the 1930s and 1940s, the United States 
implemented a labor law regime that protected the right of workers to form 
labor unions. Then, during the 1950s and 1960s, Congress and many state 
legislatures passed laws aimed at eliminating employment discrimination 
based on race, sex, rei igion, and national origin. Because these two regimes 
developed at different times, in dramatically different political contexts, 
American labor law, and American employment discrimination law were 
based on different, sometimes contradictory, premises. Labor law was fo-
cused on the rights of the group, employment discrimination law on the 
rights of individuals. By the end of the 1960s, the contradictions between 
these prelnises resulted in doctrinal conflicts between the two areas of the 
law, and,more importantly, between the two interest groups that depended 
* Professor of Law, University of Cal ifornia, Hastings College of the Law. This a rticle is based 
on a lecture I gave at the Nihon University College of Law in June of 201 1. My thanks to Dean 
Minoru Sugimoto and all the faculty and staff at Nihon for their extremely generous hospital-
ity. I am particularly indebted to Professor Yasuo Fukuda for making all the arrangements 
for my visit and for acting as my host. I would also like to thank Professor Rikiya Sakamato, 
who acted as both a gracious host and a superb translator during my v isit. Finally, I would 
like to thank Emily Yao for her excellent research assistance with this art icle. 
1) Reuel E. Schiller, Reg ulating the Workplace: Three Models of Labor and Employment Law 
in the United States, 29 NIHON UNIV. COMPo L. 138 (2012); see also Renel E. Schiller, D(fferent 
Cultures, Different Conflicts: Sex Discrimination Lmv and the United States and Japan, 28 
NIHON . UNIV. COMPo L. 127 (201 1). 
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on each regime for their legal rights. This conflict had a profound impact 
on American politics at the end of the twentieth century. 
American labor law is based on three basic principles: workplace majori-
tarianism, exclusive representation, and voluntarism.2) A union is permitted 
to bargain on behalf of workers in a particular workplace only if a majority 
of those workers vote to have that union represent them. 3) This is known 
as workplace majoritarianism. Once a union has received those votes, it 
negotiates a collective bargaining agreement on behalf of all the workers 
in the workplace, including those who did not vote for the union and those 
who refuse to join the union. These dissenting workers may not get another 
union to negotiate on their behalf. Nor may they bargain with the employer 
directly. This is known as the principle of exclusive representation. 4) 
Once the workers have chosen to be represented by a union, the gov-
ernment steps out of the process.S) The union and the employer negotiate 
the contract. If they are unable to agree, differences are resolved through 
the weapons of economic conflict: strikes, lockouts, replacement workers, 
boycotts, picketing. American labor law explicitly forbids the government 
from resolving these disputes. Similarly, disputes that arise under collec-
tive bargaining agreements are resolved through private arbitration, the ar-
bitrators having been picked by the union and the employer. Absent excep-
tional circumstances, American courts simply enforce the results of these 
private arbitrations, regardless of the merits of a particular decision.6) This 
system of industrial relations is known as volunterism. 
Workplace majoritarianism, exclusive representation, and voluntarism 
are not the only models of labor law available to policy-makers.7) They 
developed in the United States for specific, historical reasons. Each re-
flected aspects of the political culture of the 1930s and 1940s, the decades 
2) Schiller, Regulating the Workplace, 29 NIHoN UNIV. COMPo L. 138 (2012). 
3) 29 U.S.c. § 159 (2013). 
4) 1.1. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 333 (1944) and Emporium 
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition, 420 U.S. 50, 64-60, 70 (1975). 
5) National Labor Relations Act, S 2926, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess ., Congressional Record 78 
(June 6, 1934): 10559. See also Senate Committee on Education and Labor, National Labor 
Relations Act, 74th Cong., 1 st sess., 1935, S. Rep. 573; Terminal Railroad Association of St. 
Louis v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1,6 (1943). 
6) United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co. , 363 U.S. 574 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
Katherine Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE LJ. 1509, 1515, 
1531-35 (1980-81). 
7) KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 494-765 (Leo Kanowitz trans. 
2002); STEFAN LI NGE MANN ET AL., EMPLOYM ENT & LABOR LAW IN GERMANY 52-68 (2008); FOL-
KE SCHMIDT, LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS lN SWEDEN (1977). 
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in which the foundational statutes of American labor law - the National 
Labor Relations Act, and the Labor Management Relations Act (generally 
referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act) - were passed. Voluntarism, for ex-
ample, was a product of two different developments in American politics. 
The first of these was the extreme governmental hostility towards labor 
unions in nineteenth and early twentieth century.8) During that time, fed-
eral and state courts frequently enjoined labor union activities - strikes, 
boycotts, organizational campaigns - and incarcerated labor union leaders. 
State and local police forces often supplemented private security forces in 
suppressing labor activity. When unions were able to use their political 
strength to pass legislation favorable to working people, the laws were fre-
quently held unconstitutional by courts. Consequently, when, during the 
1930s, unions finally had a hospitable political and judicial climate, many 
of labor's advocates, particularly those belonging to the country's largest 
labor federation, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), sought to cre-
ate a legal regime that prohibited the government from entering into labor 
disputes or involving itself in the formation of or interpretation of collective 
bargaining agreements. 
By the end of the 1930s, however, not all trade unionists were convinced 
that the government should remain neutral in the battle between labor and 
management. In particular, left-leaning unions affiliated with the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) hoped to use their newly acquired politi-
cal power to harness governmental actors to their side of the collective bar-
gaining process.9) Labor, management, and the state would work together 
to manage the economy. This vision of codetermined industrial planning 
did not survive the end of World War II.IO) Postwar strike waves soured 
public opinion on unions. This, in turn, emboldened American businesses 
to launch a counter-offensive against the labor movement. At the same 
time, the rise of anticommunism in the years immediately following the 
War caused the CIO to purge from its ranks many of its most statist leaders. 
As a result, by the end of the 1940s, the voluntarist beliefs of the AFL came 
to dominate the thinking of the American labor movement. 
Similarly, the principles of workplace majoritarianism and exclusive 
8) WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND TH E SHAPING Of THE AMERICAN LABOR M OVEM ENT (1989); Cath-
e rine Fisk, 'Still Learning Something of Legislation' The Judiciary and the History of Labor 
Law, 19 L AW AND SOClAL I NQUIRY 151 (1994). 
9) CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLlNS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE OR-
GANIZED LABOR M OVEM ENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985), 99-245; NELSON LICHTENSTEIN , THE 
STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR (2003), 54-97. 
10) ALAN BRIN KLEY, THE END OF R EFORM: N EW DEAL LIBERALISM IN R ECESSION AN D WAR (1996), 
201-226; TOMLlNS , supra note 9, at 317-28; LlCHTENSTEIN, supra note 9, at 141-77. 
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representation stemmed from the particular political context of the 1930s. 
First of all, both doctrines were a response to the rise of company unions 
in the 1920s and early 1930s. Trade unions realized that employers could 
weaken independent unions by establishing their own unions in the work-
place and tempting workers to join them with an offer of higher wages and 
benefits, both of which would disappear once the threat of the independent 
union passed. II) Similarly, employers were able to undermine the ability of 
unions to organize their workforces by playing rival unions off against one 
another.12) In particular, the 1930s saw bitter conflict between the AFL and 
the CIO. By requiring workers to pick a single union and then prohibiting 
other unions from representing workers at a give workplace, workplace ma-
joritarianism and exclusive representation prevented employers from using 
company unions or the rival federations to weaken an incumbent union. 
The emphasis on workplace majoritarianism and exclusive representation 
also reflected the political culture of the United States during the 1930s. 
The Great Depression caused a dramatic upwelling of class consciousness 
in the United States. l3) This resulted in a heightened belief in both the need 
to use the law to redistribute wealth downwards and an emphasis on shap-
ing public policy to the will of the majority. This contrasted dramatically 
with an early twentieth century political culture that placed a much greater 
weight on laissez-faire principles and individual rights against the govern-
ment. Consequently, the fact that workplace majoritarianism and exclusive 
representation had the effect of limiting the power of individuals to object 
to union membership and to negotiate individual employment contracts 
was seen as unproblematic. Because workplace majoritarianism and exclu-
sive representation facilitated the will of the majority to redistribute wealth 
from employers to workers, the rights of individual workers had to conform 
to that goal. During the 1930s, American political culture did not value 
11) LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 9, at 36-38; TOMLINS, supra note 9, at 84-85, 93-95, 132; PHILIP S. 
FONER,3 HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 42-43 (1964); see also Daniel 
Nelson, The Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A Reexamination. 56 BUSINESS HISTORY 
REVIEW 335-57 (1982). 
12) TOMLINS, supra note 9, at 150-69, 177-99,248-50; LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 9, at 44-56; see 
also ROBERT H. ZEIGER, FOR JOBS AND FREEDOM: RACE AND LABOR IN AMERICA SINCE 1865 110-
13, 127-29, 136-37 (2007). 
13) For the basic historiography of the New Deal see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVElT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963); ANTHONY J. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION 
YEARS 34-37 (1989); David KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRES-
SION AND WAR (1999); and IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF 
OUR TIME (2013). 
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individual autonomy as much as it did before, or as much as it would later. 14) 
American labor law thus bears the mark of the historical period in which 
it was created - suspicious of both courts and of the rights of the individual; 
aimed at promoting economic equality; emphasizing private ordering and 
the power of the group. American employment discrimination law, a legal 
regime created during the 1960s, is a creature of a very different time. IS) 
By the 1960s American political culture had changed dramatically from 
the 1930s.16) The rights that employment discrimination law created were 
individual rights. Furthermore, these rights were not designed to protect 
a particular economic class. Instead, they protected people from adverse 
employment actions taken on the basis of some unchangeable characteristic 
- race, sex, national origin. Additionally, employment discrimination law 
was primarily enforced through private lawsuits in court rather than by 
arbitrations or an administrative agency. Each of these elements of the law 
of employment discrimination reflected significant changes in American 
political culture between the 1930s and the 1960s 
The first of these changes was the dramatic change in what the gov-
ernment viewed as the primary social problem in American society. Not 
surprisingly, during the Great Depression, the government focused on eco-
nomic inequality as the primary problem to be solved. Consequently, la-
bor and employment laws such as the National Labor Relations Act or the 
Fair Labor Standards Act were specifically aimed at red istributing wealth 
downwards from employers to their workers. 
After World War II, the problem of racial and ethnic discrimination 
replaced economic inequality as the primary domestic problem that the 
government sought to eradicate. I?) This change occurred for a variety of 
reasons: postwar economic prosperity made class issues less salient to pol-
icy-makers; the Cold War and the rise of anticommunism caused policy-
makers to downplay any class conflict that did exist; American propaganda 
14) Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise. and the Emergence of New 
Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007); and WI LLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGAL. 
1ST REFORMAT ION: LAW POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK , 1920-1980 (2002), 271-368. 
15) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the primary piece offederallegislation prohib-
iting employment discrimination. 42 U. S.c. § 2000e. Many states also passed such legisla-
tion in the 1950s and 1960s. See, for example, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a)-(o). 
16) Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Chang-
ing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1431-32, 1435 (2000); see also 
NELSON, supra note 14. 
17) THOMAS 1. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY : THE FORGOTTEN STRUGG LE FOR CiVIL RIGHTS 
IN THE NORTH (2008); Michael 1. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROWN TO ClvrL RIGHTS: TH E SUPREME 
COU RT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUA LITY (2004); TAY LOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: 
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS (1998); TAYLOR BRANCH , AT CANAAN'S EDGE: AMERICA I.N THE 
KI NG YEA RS (2006). 
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portrayed the war against Nazi Germany as a war against racism and this 
fact helped white Americans grow accustomed to the idea of racial and 
ethnic pluralism even as it raised the expectations of racial and ethnic mi-
norities in the United States; discriminatory racial practices in America 
proved to be an obstacle as the United States and the Soviet Union sought 
to gain allies among recently decolonialized countries in Asia and Africa. IS) 
American labor and employment law followed this changed policy prior-
ity. During the 1950s, most states outside of the American South passed 
laws prohibiting racial, ethnic and religious discrimination.19) In 1964, the 
federal government passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibited sex discrimination as welI.2°) 
Another shift in American political culture was a change in how people 
believed public policy should be made. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, 
most American policy-makers and politicians believed in what was called 
"the group basis of politics."2I) The best public policy, it was believed, 
was made when the government implemented policies that represented a 
conlpromise among different interest groups. In the 1950s, such interest 
groups were not condemned, as they are in contemporary American po-
litical culture, but were instead seen as the building blocks of a vibrant, 
democratic society. They represented the collective interests of people 
whose individual voices were easily ignored in a vast, complex society. 
Compromises among interest groups were the best way to ensure that the 
government implemented the wishes of most Americans. Labor and em-
ployment laws that promoted strong unions and elevated the power of the 
union over that of its individual members (doctrines such as exclusive rep-
18) Sugrue, supra note 17, at 76-81, 96-102, 170-83,255-71,356-65 79-82 , 105,318. See also 
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AM ER ICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2000),47-61, 79-82. 
19) Francis H. Fox, Discrimination and Antidiscrimination in Massachusetts Law, 44 B.u. L. 
REV. 30 (1964); Derrick A. Bell, Jr. Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Act, 17 U. PlTT. 
L. REV. 438 (1955-1956); Elmer A. Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation Experience Under the New York Law Against Discrimination, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 
40 (1954-1955); Monroe Berger, The New York State Law Against Discrimination: Operation 
and Administration, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 747 (1949-1950); Patricia Ward Crowe, Complainant 
Reactions to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 12 LAW & SOCIETY RE-
VIEW 217-36 (Winter 1978); Richard B. Dyson and Elizabeth D. Dyson, Commission Enforce-
ment of State Laws Against Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of the Kansas Act, 58 
MICH. L. REV. 920 (1959-1960); Carl A. Auerbach, The 1967 Amendments to the Minnesota 
State Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Dis-
crimination Act: A comparative Analysis andEva/uation, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 231 (1967-1968); 
Joseph Minsky, FEPC in Illinois: Four Stormy Years , 41 NOTRE DAME L. 152 (1965-1966); 
Charles H. Wiggins, Jr. , Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, 19650. ILL. L.F. 267 (1965). 
20) 42 U.S .C. § 2000e. 
21) Schiller, supra note 16, at 1438. 
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resentation and workplace majoritarianism), fit perfectly with this way of 
viewing the political process. 
By the 1960s, the group basis of politics had fallen out of favor. 22) Inter-
est groups came increasingly to be viewed as "special interests," whose 
only concern was promoting the interest of their group over the public inter-
est. As the 1960s wore on, Americans came to believe that government was 
dominated by unrepresentative interest groups. The law, many believed, 
needed to protect individuals from such groups. Indeed, the employment 
discrimination laws that came into being in the 1960s were designed to 
have such an effect - to protect individual rights against groups (such as 
unions or corporations) that would discriminate against them. 
The final change in American political culture that occurred between the 
1930s, when America's basic labor laws were enacted, and the 1960s, when 
its employment discrimination laws were passed, was a dramatic shift in 
the role that courts were expected to play in American policy-making. In 
the 1930s, the progressive politicians who came into power because of the 
Great Depression hated courts.23) They viewed them as reactionary entities 
- allies of the business elites who were blamed for the Great Depression. 
These courts held reform legislation unconstitutional. 24) They enjoined 
strikes.25) They convicted labor union activists.261 Consequently, the judi-
ciary was marginalized by the labor law regime these politicians created. 
The law was implemented primarily by an administrative agency - the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board - and by private arbitrations between unions 
and employers that courts were expected to rubber stamp. 
By the 1960s, however, courts were back in the favor of liberal policy-
makersYl The politics of the federal judiciary in particular had changed 
dramatically. Far from being the engine of reaction, during the 1950s, 
federal courts were increasingly viewed as the institution responsible for 
implementing liberalism's goal of racial and ethnic egalitarianism. The 
United States Supreme Court was becoming increasingly active in protect-
ing the constitutional rights of minorities and individuals. 28) Thus, when 
22) Schiller, supra note 16, at 1410-13. 
23) Schiller, supra note 2, at 402-403. 
24) Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); 
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Forbath supra note 8, at 37-58. 
25) FELIX FRANKFURTER, TH E LABOR INJU NCTION (1930), 17-23; Forbath supra note 8, at 59-97. 
26) In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); Forbath supra note 8, at 98-127. 
27) Schiller, supra note 16, at 1423-26, 1443. 
28) For an encyclopedic description of the rise of the federal judiciary as the promoter of ra-
cial egalitarianism and the protector of civil liberties in the years following World War 11, 
see MELVIN 1. UROFSKY ET AL., 2 MARCH OF LIBERTY (2011). See also, LAURA KALMAN, THE 
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERA LfSM (1998). 
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policy-makers in the 1960s began to craft a legal regime to combat employ-
ment discrimination, they entrusted it to courts. The primary method of 
enforcing federal antidiscrimination laws would be lawsuits filed in courts. 
Administrative agencies and private arbitrators were excluded from the 
process. 
These changes resulted into two legal regimes with very different sets of 
rules and institutions. Labor law, crafted primarily in the 1930s and 1940s, 
empowered the poor against the rich, and favored the rights of the group 
over the individual. The law of employment discrimination, created dur-
ing the 1960s, was concerned with the rights of minorities and women, not 
the poor. Its goal was to protect individuals against the overbearing power 
of the group. Furthermore, each area of law was enforced by different 
institutions: labor law by an administrative agency and private arbitrators, 
employment discrimination law by the courts. 29) These differing goals and 
institutions resulted in a conflict between the two regimes. This conflict, 
in turn, led to a great deal of instability and, ultimately, to the profound 
weakening of labor unions in the United States. 
The bitter struggle between unions and civil rights groups over the se-
niority provisions of collective bargaining agreements is an excellent ex-
ample of this conflict. For the labor movement, seniority was one of the 
most jealously guarded benefits that came out of the collective bargain-
ing process. By ensuring that workers' promotions were based primarily 
on how long they had been with a company, unions were able to constrain 
an employer's freedonl to make promotions that were either arbitrary or 
to the disadvantage of workers who had been in a particular job for a long 
time. 
From the perspective of African American workers, however, seniority 
was an institution that ensured that they rarely got promoted and that they 
were the first workers laid-off when economic times got hard.30) Prior to 
1964, almost all hiring in the United States was race-based. The best jobs 
went to white workers. Black workers were excluded from the workforce 
or given only the least desirable jobs. Even thought seniority was "race 
neutral," its effect was to ensure that black workers remained on the lowest 
rungs of the employment ladder, because they made up a disproportion-
ate number of recently hired workers and workers in low-skilled, junior 
positions. Since the 1940s, white union leaders had insisted that eventu-
29) P AUL FRYM ER, BLACK AND B LUE : AFRI CAN AM ERICAN S, TH E LABOR M OVEMENT, AND THE DE-
CLINE OF THE D EMOCR ATIC PART Y (2007), 22-43. 
30) N ANC Y MACLEAN, FREEDO M IS N OT E NOUGH (2006), 29; Z EIGE R, supra note 12 , at 166-67; see 
also WILLI AM B. G OU LD , BLACK W ORKERS IN WHI TE U N IONS (1977), 67-69. 
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ally African Americans would benefit from seniority provisions because 
they would prevent racial discrimination by employers. 31) However, it never 
seemed to work that way. Job turnover among black workers was excep-
tionally high not only because black workers were predominately in lower 
skilled jobs but also because of endemic discrimination in both hiring and 
promotion. Consequently, by the early 1960s, it was apparent that seniority 
was of limited benefit to black workers. Indeed, it was clear that ridged en-
forcement of seniority provisions ensured that African American workers 
remained in the lowest paying, most menial jobs. 
The solution to this problem, as far as leaders of the Civil Rights Move-
ment were concerned, was "affirmative action."32) African Americans, it 
was argued, should be given "super-seniority" to make up for the fact that, 
historically, they had been discriminated against. If ten percent of the pop-
ulation was African American, should not ten percent of the supervisors at 
a given company be black? In its most extreme form, affirmative action 
would require a company to promote African Americans to supervisory 
positions, regardless of seniority, until the made of ten percent of all super-
VIsors. 
The Civil Rights Movement sought to implement affirmative action pro-
grams in a number of ways.33) First of all, it used economic and political 
pressure. During the early 1960s, it used picketing, strikes, boycotts, and 
public protests to convince businesses to implement affirmative action pro-
grams in hiring and promotion. It also used its political muscle to convince 
federal, state, and local governments to require the businesses they con-
tracted with to implement affirmative action programs. In unionized work-
places, however, these tactics were unsuccessfuL When civil rights groups 
convinced an employer to implement a program, the labor union represent-
ing that employer's workers would have the agreement thrown out as a vio-
lation of the collective bargaining agreement. The white workers within 
most unions did not wish to have their seniority diluted by such programs. 
Because of this problem, the Civil Rights Movement developed different 
tactics for promoting affirmative action programs in unionized workplac-
31) Z EIGER, supra note 12, at 167. See also SUGRUE, supra note 17, at 91-92. 
32) MACLEAN, supra note 30, at 42-43, 54-6 1; PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT A CTION TO AFFIR-
MATIVE ACTION: FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW AND POLICY I.N AMERICA (1997),145-54,157-61 , 189-90; 
JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002), 85, 87-89; SUGRUE, supra note 
17, at 267-69,273-77. 
33) SUGRUE, supra note 17, at 267-69, 271-285, 273-77. 
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es. These tactics involved attacking the incumbent union. 34) Some African 
American leaders called for the formation of independent, all-black unions, 
to represent the needs of black workers exclusively. Others thought that 
African American workers should stay within white-led unions, but that the 
law should allow black workers to negotiate with employers directly. Each 
of these strategies, African American leaders believed, would allow black 
workers to pressure employers to implement affirmative action programs. 
Of course, both strategies would also require the abandonment of the prin-
ciple of exclusive representation. During the 1960s and 1970s, both the 
National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts rejected the attempts 
of African American workers to do this. 35) 
The failure to implement affirmative action programs in unionized 
workplaces either by direct pressure or by the abandonment of the principle 
of exclusive representation, forced African American workers to use yet 
another tactic, and this final one was successful. Starting in the late 1960s, 
black workers began suing their employers and their unions using Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.36) When they won these law suits, which 
they frequently did, they would request a remedy that included affirmative 
action. If a court held that Title VII required the implementation of an af-
firmative action program, that holding would set aside the seniority provi-
sions of the collective bargaining agreement. It would thus allow African 
American workers who had been systematically discriminated against to 
get superseniority, thereby leaping over white workers. 
This campaign for affirmative action - the direct pressure, the attacks on 
exclusive representation, and the lawsuits under Title VII - had a profound 
effect on American politics in the late 1960s.37) Labor union members and 
African Americans were two of the main constituencies that supported the 
Democratic Party, the political party that had dominated American politics 
since the 1930s. This coalition began to break apart in the late 1960s as the 
34) Frymer, supra note 29, 47-6\. See also JUDITH STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, RUNNING AMERICA : 
RACE, ECONOMIC POLICY, AND THE DECLINE Of LIBERALISM (\998); Kieran Taylor, American 
Petrograd: Detroit and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers in AARON BRENNER, ET 
AL., REBEL RANK AND FILE 311-54 (2010), 311-54. 
35) Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition, 420 U.S. 50 (1975). 
36) STEIN, supra note 34, at 147-96; FRYMER, supra note 29, at 71-72,83-90, 95-97; MACLEAN, 
supra note 30, at 70-75, 103-104, 335-36. 
37) JUDITH STEIN, PIVOTAL D ECADE: How THE UNITED STATES TRADED FACTORIES AND FINANCE IN 
THE SEVENTIES (2010), 137-42; BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, TH E SEVENTIES: TH E GREAT SHIFT IN AMERI-
CAN CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS (2001), 2-3, 54-58; STEVE FRASER AND GARY GERSTLE, 
EDS., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 (1989), 231-32, 243-44, 248-49; 
LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 1974-1980 (2010), 180-94, 198-201 ; 
THOMAS BYRNE EDSA LL AN D MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RIGHTS, RACE, 
AND TAXES ON AM ERICAN POLITICS (1992), 107-108, 122-31,136,138-39. 
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opposition party - the Republicans - peeled white union members out of 
this coalition by attacking affirmative action. Indeed, many white union 
tnembers were happy to leave the Democratic Party, which they perceived 
as dominated by African Americans and their white, liberal supporters, 
who seemed intent on depriving them of the job security that seniority sys-
tems had provided. 
This political conflict, which ultimately ended the Democratic Party's 
domination of American politics, stemmed from law. Postwar American 
liberalism had generated two labor and employment law regimes. One, cre-
ated during the 1930s, sought to alleviate class disparities by empowering 
unions and protecting them from outside pressures. The other, created dur-
ing the 1960s, sought to eliminate racial discrimination by allowing indi-
viduals to sue their employers and their unions if either engaged in discrim-
inatory employment practices. In the late 1960s, these two regimes were 
being used to attack each other. Because they were based on antithetical 
premises, neither was able to accommodate the interests of the other. Labor 
law could not give up workplace majoritarianism, exclusive representation, 
or volunteerism. Similarly, the law of employment discrimination could 
not give up affirmative action and its right to sue unions over seniority sys-
tems. The inflexibility of each legal regime helped generate the political 
conflict that weakened American liberalism, and ended the power of the 
Democratic Party. 
This narrative helps explain the rise of the Republican Party in the 1970s 
and the movement of the Democratic Party to the political center during 
the 1990s. It also helps explain why labor unions in the United States have 
become so weak in the last thirty years. The extensive conflicts that they 
have had with non-white workers have made it increasingly difficult for 
labor unions to recruit members of the United States' increasingly diverse 
workforce. This story also illustrates a broader point relevant to anyone 
who studies the law. When we study law we frequently focus on its smallest 
details: How do you determine if a contract is binding? What is the remedy 
for a particular injury? How does a government agency issue regulations? 
How else would we learn the law without such attention to the intricacies 
of legal doctrine? Because we spend so much time focused on these details, 
however, we frequently lose sight of the fact that law is a product of society. 
The law is shaped by the politics and the culture in which it sits, just as the 
law shapes politics and culture. 
